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NOTE
CONDITIONS ON TAKING THE INITIATIVE:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF SUBJECT
MATTER RESTRICTIONS ON BALLOT INITIATIVES
Anna Skiba-Crafts*
Nearly half of U.S. states offer a ballot initiative process that citi-
zens may use to pass legislation or constitutional amendments by a
popular vote. Some states, however, impose substantive restrictions
on the types of initiatives citizens may submit to the ballot for a
vote-precluding, for example, initiatives lowering drug penalties
or initiatives related to religion. Circuit courts are split on whether
and how such restrictions implicate the First Amendment.
This Note argues that-rather than limiting "expressive conduct"
protected only minimally by the First Amendment, or limiting pure
conduct that does not garner any First Amendment protection-
subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives constrain "core po-
litical speech" and so should receive strict First Amendment
scrutiny. It asserts that the rationales underlying the First Amend-
ment counsel for the recognition of initiatives as pure speech, and
that ballot initiatives fit into the specific doctrinal category of "core
political speech."
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INTRODUCTION
In several states, voters have the opportunity to make law directly
through the use of the ballot initiative, a tool of "direct democracy."' Citi-
zens have registered their opinions at the ballot box to legislate collectively
on issues such as bilingual education, gun control, abortion, cigarette taxes,
physician-assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage.2 But in some states that
offer an initiative process, initiatives on certain topics are impeded by extra
procedural requirements or are prohibited altogether. Utah, for example,
subjects any ballot initiative affecting wildlife management (hunting) to a
unique two-thirds majority requirement.' Massachusetts citizens may not put
an initiative related to religion on the ballot;4 citizens of the District of
Columbia may not submit an initiative to decrease penalties for marijuana
5
use.
1. Ballot initiatives can produce either statutes or constitutional amendments.
2. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING 111-19 (1999); INITIA-
TIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, STATEWIDE INITIATIVES SINCE 1904-2000, http://
www.iandrinstitute.org/New%201RI%2OWebsite%2OInfo/Drop%2ODown%2OBoxes/Historical/Stat
ewide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
3. UTAH CONST. alt. VI, § 1.
4. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt.2, § 2.
5. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 E3d 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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This Note considers whether and how restrictions on the subject matter
6
of ballot initiatives implicate the First Amendment. It addresses the ques-
tion by examining the nature of the ballot initiative-meaning the actual
appearance of an initiative on the ballot for a vote'-in relation to First
Amendment theory and doctrine. Constraints on initiative subject matter
could be construed as 1) direct restrictions on "core political speech" likely
to be struck down; 2) restrictions on "expressive conduct" subject only to
very relaxed First Amendment review, as the First Circuit has held; or
3) regulations on pure conduct that do not restrict First Amendment-
protected expression at all, as the Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have
held.'
This Note argues that state-imposed restrictions on the subject matter of
ballot initiatives do implicate the First Amendment, and, specifically, that
they constrain "core political speech" and so should be subject to strict scru-
tiny.9 Part I puts the issue in context, providing background on ballot
initiatives, discussing subject matter restrictions, and describing the different
conclusions courts have reached about the First Amendment implications of
these restrictions. Part II applies broad First Amendment theory to ballot
initiatives, asserting that the basic principles underlying the amendment
suggest that it should protect ballot initiatives. This Part argues that the pro-
tection of ballot initiatives as speech is congruent with the fundamental aims
of the First Amendment, given the amendment's special focuses on political
speech and self-governance, on exchanges occurring in the public sphere,
and on maintaining a "marketplace" of ideas. Part III applies specific First
Amendment case law to subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives. It
argues that such restrictions are appropriately characterized under current
doctrine as limitations on "core political speech," rather than as the type of
neutral election regulations that are considered innocuous under the First
6. The First Amendment implications of subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives are
particularly significant as both initiative use and subject matter restrictions increase. See infra notes
13, 39 and accompanying text.
7. In a Note entitled Loading the Dice in Direct Democracy: The Constitutionality of Con-
tent- and Viewpoint-Based Regulations of Ballot Initiatives, J. Michael Connolly takes a different
approach, evaluating the First Amendment implications of subject matter restrictions by considering
the restrictions' effect on the speech surrounding initiatives, including the petitioning process that
citizens must undertake before submitting an initiative to the ballot. See J. Michael Connolly, Note,
Loading the Dice in Direct Democracy: The Constitutionality of Content- and Viewpoint-Based
Regulations of Ballot Initiatives, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 129, 148-51 (2008).
8. See infra Section I.C. A court's conclusion that subject matter restrictions implicate the
First Amendment does not automatically mean they violate it. Members of City Council v. Taxpay-
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803--04 (1984). In fact, the one circuit court that found that the First
Amendment applied to subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives upheld the restrictions. Wirz-
burger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 2005). This Note concludes that subject matter restrictions
on ballot initiatives should garner strict First Amendment scrutiny, but does not address whether
they actually violate the First Amendment in any given instance, or consider exactly how the strict
scrutiny standard should be applied.
9. Although none of the circuit courts have taken this approach, it has substantial support in
the case law and First Amendment principles more generally.
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Amendment-and so should be protected from government interference
with their content.
I. BALLOT INITIATIVES, SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS, AND THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON WHETHER AND How RESTRICTIONS
IMPLICATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Part provides background on how subject matter restrictions on
ballot initiatives operate in order to frame the question of whether and how
such restrictions implicate the First Amendment. Section L.A briefly ex-
plains the initiative process, the history behind the development of the
initiative in the United States, and some benefits and drawbacks of initia-
tive use. Section I.B describes subject matter restrictions, distinguishing
substantive restrictions from procedural or structural limitations and out-
lining some of the motivations behind subject matter restrictions. Section
I.C frames the legal question, laying out the conclusions and arguments of
the courts in the circuit split.
A. Ballot Initiatives
Ballot initiatives allow citizens to submit a proposed statute or consti-
tutional amendment to a popular vote for enactment, bypassing the
legislature.'0 The ballot initiative arose in the western United States in the
early 1900s, promoted by Populists who were disillusioned with represen-
tative democracy and believed direct democracy would increase citizen
involvement in politics, make government more democratic, and circum-
vent the influence of special interests and money." Currently, twenty-four
states and the District of Columbia maintain ballot initiative procedures."
10. "Direct" initiatives send statutes or constitutional amendments directly to a popular vote
for adoption, while "indirect" initiatives require the legislature's approval before the citizens have
the opportunity to pass them by popular vote. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING
ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (1984) [hereinafter MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION]; Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures
That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 50-51 (1995). Other forms of direct democracy
include the advisory initiative, which invites popular vote on an issue simply to demonstrate public
opinion to the legislature, see Charles M. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and
Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 246 (1975), and the referendum, in
which a measure passed by the legislature requires subsequent approval by a popular vote in order to
be enacted. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Ref-
erendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 14 (1995). In the United States, the initiative exists at the
state and local levels, but not the federal level. Collins & Oesterle, supra, at 49-50. A federal ballot
initiative process has been considered, but not implemented. See Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?,
supra, at 17-18 & n.23. This Note considers subject matter restrictions on statewide direct initia-
tives, both statutory and constitutional.
11. See MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 20-25, 27-28; Collins & Oest-
erie, supra note 10, at 56; Dina E. Conlin, Note, The Ballot Initiative in Massachusetts: The Fallacy
of Direct Democracy, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2004).
12. M. Dane Waters, Introduction to THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING, at xv (M.
Dane Waters ed., 2001); INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, STATE-BY-STATE LIST OF
1308 [Vol. 107:1305
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Use of the process has increased over the last few decades and continues
to rise.
13
To place an initiative on the ballot, citizens must fulfill certain proce-
dural requirements. 4 Generally, initiative proponents first must get the
proposed statutory or constitutional text certified by the appropriate state
official.'" Proponents then have a limited period during which to collect a
specified number of signatures by circulating petitions.16 If enough of the
collected signatures are validated by the clerk or registrar, the secretary of
state will approve the initiative to appear on the ballot in the next elec-
tion. 7 Some states explain the initiatives to voters through a mailed
pamphlet or publication in the newspaper before the election. '8 If a major-
ity of voters approves an initiative at the ballot, it will pass into law.
In the 2008 elections there were fifty-nine state initiatives on ballots
across the country. 19 Initiatives approved by voters in 2008 included a ban
on affirmative action in public institutions (Nebraska), an English-only
requirement for government meetings involving public business
(Missouri), same-sex marriage bans (California, Florida, and Arizona), the
legalization of medicinal marijuana use (Michigan), and a prohibition on
farms' confinement of egg-laying hens, calves raised for veal, and preg-
nant pigs (California).
The ballot initiative has been touted for several benefits. In addition to
countering the potential influence of special interests on legislators,
21initiatives can circumvent legislative gridlock . Initiatives may also serve
as a check on representatives, making them more responsive to their
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROVISIONS, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide-i&r.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009).
13. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 25-27; Richard B. Collins, How
Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 983-84, 995 (2001); Conlin, supra note 11,
at 1088, 1093-94; Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 10, at 17-18; David S. Broder, Bal-
lot Battle: Collecting Signaturesfor a Price, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at Al.
14. See MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 53-58; ZIMMERMAN, supra note
2, at 31-50.
15. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 54; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 31-
33. This official can be the secretary of state, attorney general, or lieutenant governor. Id. at 31.
16. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 56; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 40.
States impose varying restrictions on the petitioning process. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 40-42.
17. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 56; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 42-
45.
18. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 56-58; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at
45-47.
19. Jennie Drage Bowser, Ballot Measures Preview 2008, ST. LEGIS. MAG. Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/2008_ballot_update.htm.
20. Id.
21. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 28; Philip P. Frickey, The Communion
of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public
Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 421,431 (1998).
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constituents.22 Direct lawmaking can be especially influential in areas of
legislation that involve a potential conflict of interest for legislators, such
as campaign finance and lobbying rules, election regulations, term limits,
23and lawmakers' salaries. Initiatives may also encourage public debate and
improve voter turnout.2
On the other hand, criticisms-of both the procedure and its results-
abound. Perhaps the biggest concern is the potential for money to drive the
initiative process. The availability of the procedure has given rise to a full-
fledged industry around the drafting of initiatives, circulation of petitions,
and advertising; 5 the balance of financial resources often determines the
26
results. Ballot initiatives also lack what many think are positive features of• 27
decision making by a representative body: compromise, the opportunity to
refine and modify proposed legislation,28 transparency and accountability,
29
the weighing of priorities across issues, ° and the consideration of multiple
alternatives before adopting a rule.3' By displacing the legislature, lawmak-
ing by initiative may also forego much consideration of legislation's long-
term effects 32 and the benefits of checks like bicameralism and the executive
22. John B. Anderson & Nancy C. Ciampa, Ballot Initiatives: Recommendations for Change,
FLA. BAR J., Apr. 1997, at 71; Frickey, supra note 21, at 431.
23. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 135-36; Collins, supra note 13, at 990.
24. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 28; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 136;
Anderson & Ciampa, supra note 22, at 71.
25. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 76; Frickey, supra note 21, at 432-33;
Broder, supra note 13. A related complaint is that out-of-state forces are increasingly driving initia-
tive campaigns. See Ryan K. Manger, Note, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation:
Can the State Preserve Direct Democracy for the Citizen, Or Will It Be Consumed by the Special
Interest Group?, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 177, 182 (2000); Jennie Drage Bowser, Ballot Meas-
ure Results: A Bad Night for Many, A Great Night for a Few, ST. LEGIS. MAG., Nov. 8, 2006,
http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/06ballotmeasures.htm.
26. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 29; Anderson & Ciampa, supra note
22, at 72-73; Collins, supra note 13, at 998. This is ironic given that ballot initiatives were origi-
nally expected to skirt the influence of money on lawmaking. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 10,
at 56.
27. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 29-30, 184; Hans A. Linde, Practic-
ing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1739 (1998);
Elizabeth R. Leong, Note, Ballot Initiatives & Identifiable Minorities: A Textual Call to Congress,
28 RUTGERS L.J. 677, 689-90 (1997).
28. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 184, 186; Collins & Oesterle, supra
note 10, at 77; Linde, supra note 27, at 1739.
29. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 188; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review
of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1553 (1990); Frickey, supra note 21, at 441; Linde, supra
note 27, at 1744.
30. Sherman J. Clark, Commentary, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 434,436 (1998).
31. K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate Initiatives to
Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (1995) ("Ballot initiatives provide
voters with a simple yes-or-no choice to respond to issues that have myriad approaches.").
32. See MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 187.
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veto." In addition, popular decision making may not be adequate for more
complicated legislative issues. 34 Related to this, a ballot listing multiple ini-
tiatives can seem overwhelmingly complex,35 perhaps deterring voter
36participation. Finally, laws passed by ballot initiatives are often harmful to
minorities.3 7 Although many of these concerns are valid-indeed, compel-
ling-this Note does not address the propriety of ballot initiatives
themselves, but rather the constitutionality of subject matter restrictions on
them, given initiatives' existence.
B. Subject Matter Restrictions
Some of the states that invite ballot initiatives will not allow initiatives
on just any issue, and so limit what types of laws or amendments citizens
may bring to a vote independently of the legislature. These subject matter
restrictions are on the rise, 39 and may become even more popular in the fu-. .. 40
ture as legislatures react to the sometimes undesirable effects of initiatives.
Currently, thirteen of the states with ballot initiatives either exclude particu-
lar subjects from the process altogether or impose unique burdens on
initiatives regarding certain subjects.4' A common obstacle is a supermajor-
ity requirement, like the one Utah applies to initiatives on hunting.42
Although heightened requirements for initiatives on certain subjects do not
technically preclude initiatives on those subjects, they often amount to (andS 43
are designed to be) "de facto" exclusions. This Note's analysis will not
distinguish between total exclusions and heightened procedural require-
ments.
33. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat
of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 735 (1994).
34. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 29, 197-98.
35. Eule, supra note 29, at 1516-17; Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 10, at 19.
36. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 197-98; DuVivier, supra note 31, at
1194; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
37. Collins, supra note 13, at 985, 989; Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Initiative and Referendum:
The Trials of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2007); Leong, supra note 27. For
example, past initiatives have targeted gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and racial minorities.
Collins, supra note 13, at 989; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 10, at 25.
39. John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing Direct Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of
Ballot Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2007).
40. See Steve C. Briggs, Op-Ed., Colorado's Constitutional Contradictions: Initiative Proc-
ess Runs Amok, DENVER POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at El; supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
41. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 29. The states with subject matter restrictions are Alaska,
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. The District of Columbia's ballot initiative process
is also subject to restrictions on initiative content. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See UTAH CONsT. art VI, § 1.
43. Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1469; see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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Limitations on initiatives' subject matter fall into two broad categories. 44
Some restrictions simply preclude initiatives that concern the procedures or
structure of government. For example, some states exclude initiatives affect-
ing the judiciary in certain ways,45 initiatives regarding taxation or
appropriations,4 or initiatives that would create separate laws for different
41geographic areas within the state. Other restrictions are more topical, pre-
cluding initiatives on specific policy matters external to the functioning of
48 49government-for example, religion, pensions for public employees, or
the right to work. ° This Note is concerned with the second category-
limitations on the substantive policy areas that may compose the subject of a
ballot initiative. It will not address restrictions that immunize the structure
and procedures of government from the ballot initiative process." These
restrictions may also have First Amendment ramifications, but probably im-
plicate First Amendment concerns less directly than the substantive
restrictions do.
While procedural and structural subject matter restrictions are often best
explained by a desire to insulate the prescribed functions and roles of gov-
ernment entities from popular control 2  substantive restrictions are
frequently driven by legislative aversion to a specific outcome. 3 The
44. See Linde, supra note 27, at 1755 ("[We] must distinguish initiatives that entrench ordi-
nary laws beyond legislative change from initiatives that alter the structure of government itself.");
Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1439, 1450-55. For a comprehensive list of subject matter exclusions
(but not supermajority requirements), see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INI-
TIATIVE SUBJECT RESTICTIONS (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/
SubRestrict.htm.
45. MASS. CONsT. amend, art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAW-
MAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 82 (1998); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2,
at 29-30.
46. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 45, at 83; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 2, at 29-30.
47. MASS. CONST. amend, art. XLVIH, pt. 2, § 2.
48. Id.
49. Miss. CONST. art. XV, § 273, subsec. 5.
50. Id.
51. A few other types of restrictions affect ballot initiatives' subject matter, but also fall
outside the scope of this Note. One is restrictions on initiatives that would not legitimately constitute
a statute or constitutional amendment. Foster v. Clark, 790 P.2d I (Or. 1990) (invalidating ballot
initiative when content was administrative and not legislative); DUBOlS & FEENEY, supra note 45, at
81 (highlighting bans on initiatives proposing legislation that the legislature itself would not be
permitted to adopt). Another is review of ballot initiatives (either pre- or post-election) for constitu-
tionality. See Friedelbaum, supra note 37, at 1010-25. Review of initiatives' constitutionality may
also implicate speech interests, a question raised in Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th
Cir. 1996). Other types of restrictions not addressed by this Note are single-subject requirements
and initiatives that have already appeared on the ballot but failed. See, e.g., DUBOlS & FEENEY,
supra note 45, at 81-82.
52. See Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1456.
53. See Connolly, supra note 7, at 153-56; Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1453-55; infra
notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing the motivations behind the District of Columbia,
Utah, and Massachusetts subject matter restrictions). This is a general observation, not an absolute
rule. Substantive restrictions may also sometimes be motivated by relatively neutral policy concerns
about leaving law on a certain subject to the mercy of the initiative process. Arkansas, for example,
1312 [Vol. 107:1305
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legislative history of the District of Columbia's prohibition on initiatives
that would lower drug penalties, for instance, reveals that this substantive
exclusion was the direct result of the legislature's policy preference at the
time it was enacted. A sponsor of the exclusion stated in floor debate that
"[w]e are sure as heck not going to make it legal to do drugs in the District
of Columbia." Utah's supermajority requirement for initiatives on wildlife
management-despite applying to initiatives both restricting and promoting
hunting-was also "baldly partisan," driven by the policy predilections of
the legislature that implemented it.55 Legislators feared that environmental-
ists from the northeast planned to bring an initiative limiting bear and
56
cougar hunting, and as the Utah Senate sponsor of the supermajority re-
quirement stated in floor debate, the rule's purpose was "definitely [to]
discourage anyone from putting anti-hunting and anti-fishing regulations on
the ballot."57 Similarly, Massachusetts's subject matter restrictions-banning
initiatives related to religion or that would change a constitutional provision
that precludes government funding for private schools-grew out of the
state legislature's aversion to supporting Catholic schools.58 At the time the
exclusion was enacted, public schools were effectively Protestant and the
legislature sought to prevent citizens from securing funding for competing
Catholic schools.5 9 The school-funding restriction was enacted four days
after a Catholic newspaper published an editorial encouraging Catholics to
cited a desire for stability in alcohol distribution to explain its heightened signature requirement for
an initiative changing a wet county to a dry one or vice versa (requiring thirty-eight percent of regis-
tered voters to sign, compared to fifteen percent for other initiatives). Wellwood v. Johnson ex rel.
Bryant, 172 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1999). And it may be the case that some procedural or
structural subject matter restrictions were initially passed to avoid a specific anticipated outcome
opposed by that particular legislature.
Neither is intent a determinative factor in this Note's First Amendment analysis. J. Michael
Connolly hinges the First Amendment significance of subject matter restrictions on the motivations
of the legislature enacting the restrictions. Connolly, supra note 7. According to Connolly, if a re-
striction is intended to prevent specific electoral results, it is viewpoint based and should receive
strict scrutiny; other subject matter restrictions are simply content based and so should receive in-
termediate scrutiny. Id. at 131-32, 151-53. Distinguishing among restrictions based on the
legislature's motiviations is problematic, however. Courts may often be guessing about legislative
intent. Justice Scalia has suggested that "it is virtually impossible to determine the singular 'motive'
of a collective legislative body," and that the First Amendment, by its terms, is concerned with the
effects of laws, rather than the motivations behind them. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). This Note describes the intent behind subject matter restrictions mainly for the sake of
background, and its analysis does not distinguish among substantive subject matter restrictions
based on the original intent of the legislature that adopted them.
54. 145 CONG. Rc. H10086 (1999). Other legislative supporters emphasized that allowing
initiatives decreasing drug penalties would make the city "a drug haven," id., and disparaged drug
users, asserting that "drug addiction is an illness of the soul as much as the body." id. at H10083.
55. Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1449-63.
56. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (10th Cir. 2006).
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Herbert, 2006 U.S.
Briefs 89717 (No. 06-534) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Justice in Support of Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 10, 15, Wirzburger v. Galvin, 2005 U.S. Briefs 519B (No. 05-5 19).
59. Id. at 4-6.
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attempt to remove the private-school funding ban, presumably through the
initiative process. 6° And the sponsor of the general religious exclusion ar-
gued at the 1917-18 state constitutional convention that the provision "was
necessary to protect the initiative and referendum against the religious fanat-
ics.
'61
C. Circuit Split on First Amendment Implications
When federal circuit courts began to consider whether and how subject
matter restrictions on ballot initiatives implicated the First Amendment, the
most relevant Supreme Court case law involved the First Amendment sig-
nificance of restrictions on those circulating initiative petitions.6 In Meyer v.
Grant, the Court struck down a prohibition on paying individuals to circu-
late petitions, finding that it restricted "core political speech. 63 In Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, the Court used the same theory to
strike down requirements that circulators be registered voters, wear name-
tags, and report their names, addresses, and payment. 4 These two cases
considered what protection the First Amendment affords the speech sur-
rounding the initiative process (not the protection the First Amendment
might provide for an actual initiative on the ballot). Against the backdrop of
these two cases, four circuit courts have addressed the First Amendment
significance of subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives.
There are various ways in which the First Amendment could apply to
subject matter restrictions, each with corresponding ramifications for the
level of scrutiny judges would apply in a First Amendment challenge. 6 First,
60. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Wirzburger v. Galvin, 2005 U.S. Briefs 519B (No.
05-519).
61. Id. at 10 (internal quotations omitted). But cf Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 285
(1st Cir. 2005) ("No evidence has been offered that the exclusion was motivated by the same Anti-
Catholic animus that impelled the passage of the original Anti-Aid Amendment.").
62. Initiative proponents must collect a certain number of signatures in order to be able to
submit an initiative to the ballot. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
63. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
64. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
65. This Note evaluates subject matter restrictions as potential restrictions on the freedom of
speech, rather than as restrictions on the freedom to associate or to petition the government, al-
though these rights might be implicated as well. See Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 E3d 1172, 1175
(9th Cir. 1999); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1496-97, 1500 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1996); Delgado
v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1495 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Initiative & Ref-
erendum Inst. v. Walker, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1309 (D. Utah 2001). Courts have also considered
the constitutionality of subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives without regard to the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (evaluating initiative restrictions
with a differential impact on minorities under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). This Note, like the cases in the circuit split described below, addresses the First
Amendment rights of initiative proponents, though the restrictions may also implicate voters' right
to receive the information (and to potentially be able to vote on it). See Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 21, Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Herbert, 2006 U.S. Briefs 89717 (No. 06-534) ("The
Court should grant certiorari [in part] to ... clarify the extent to which voting is a form of political
expression protected by the First Amendment."); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
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subject matter restrictions might implicate the First Amendment by directly
limiting "core political speech," as this Note argues. "Core political speech,"
described by the Court as "interactive communication concerning political
change,"' is a subcategory of the speech (as opposed to "expressive con-
duct") protected by the First Amendment. Government restrictions on "core
political speech" are subject to strict scrutiny, and will survive only if they
are supported by a compelling government interest and burden constitu-
tional rights no more than necessary to achieve that interest. 6' No circuit has
held that subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives limit "core political
speech.68
Second, restrictions might be construed as limiting "expressive con-
duct," as the First Circuit has held. "Expressive conduct" is activity that
69includes both expressive and pure conduct elements . Such activity receives
limited First Amendment protection." Interpreted as limitations on "expres-
sive conduct," subject matter restrictions would be subject to intermediate
scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien, meaning they will survive only if
they are within the constitutional power of the government, further a sub-
stantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, and are
narrowly tailored to meeting that interest.7 In Wirzburger v. Galvin, the First
Circuit found that Massachusetts's exclusion of initiatives related to religion
or overturning the state's ban on government funding for private schools
limited "expressive conduct." 2 Applying the O'Brien test, the court upheld
the restrictions, easily deeming them no more restrictive than necessary to
guard the state's substantial asserted interest in protecting its citizens'
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 1006 (1978); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 464 (1980).
66. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
67. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
68. A few courts have suggested that ballot initiatives are "core political speech' or that
content-based restrictions on them should be subject to strict scrutiny, but in cases that did not in-
volve subject matter restrictions. See Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1500 (upholding Florida's requirements
that ballot initiatives be confined to a single subject and have a clear title); Taxpayers United for
Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting initiative proponents' claim
that Michigan's disqualification of many of the signatures they had collected violated their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights); Wyman v. Sec'y of State, 625 A.2d 307, 311 (Me. 1993) (finding
that the secretary of state violated an initiative proponent's First Amendment rights when he refused
to furnish initiative petition forms because he personally believed the proposed legislation was un-
constitutional).
69. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
70. See id. at 377.
71. Id. Another possibility is that the restrictions limit speech in a public forum and so trig-
ger public-forum analysis. However, the Seventh Circuit has stated, in the context of advisory ballot
questions, that the ballot is not a traditional public forum. Protect Marriage I11. v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604,
606 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 86-87 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (concluding that ballot initiative voting is not a public forum).
72. 412 F.3d 271, 274-75 (1st Cir. 2005).
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religious freedom.73 Restrictions on "expressive conduct" are overwhelm-
ingly likely to be upheld.
Third, subject matter restrictions might not affect any expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and so would fail to trigger any First
Amendment review at all, as the Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have held.
In Wellwood v. Johnson ex rel Bryant, the Eighth Circuit held that
Arkansas's elevated signature requirement for submitting a ballot initiative
to change a "dry" county to a "wet" one or vice versa did not implicate the
First Amendment.74 Three years later, in Marijuana Policy Project v. United
States, the D.C. Circuit declined to apply any First Amendment review to a
prohibition on initiatives that would lower drug penalties in the District of
Columbia."5 In Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that Utah's special two-thirds majority requirement for ballot
initiatives related to hunting burdened neither "core political speech" nor
"expressive conduct" and so warranted no First Amendment review. 6
The circuit courts asserted several reasons (though not all were asserted
by every circuit) for their conclusions that subject matter restrictions on bal-
lot initiatives implicate the First Amendment only minimally (First Circuit),
or not at all (Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits). First, they maintained that
subject matter restrictions do not actually affect advocates' ability to prom-
ulgate a message. The Eighth Circuit, for example, stated that Arkansas's
differential signature requirements, despite making it harder to get a certain
type of initiative on the ballot, did not interfere with initiative proponents'
general ability to "make their views heard.'"77 The D.C. Circuit emphasized
that citizens wishing to decrease marijuana penalties "remain free to lobby,
petition, or engage in other First Amendment-protected activities to reduce
marijuana penalties. 7 ' The Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits maintained that
any political expression ballot initiatives involve is connected to the peti-
tioning process addressed in Meyer and ACLF, rather than an initiative's
73. Id. at 279.
74. 172 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1999).
75. 304 E3d at 83. This restriction took a different form from most subject matter restric-
tions, resulting from a rider to the District of Columbia appropriations act in which Congress
prohibited the D.C. Council from implementing any law reducing marijuana penalties. Id. Because
the Council maintains a ballot initiative process as part of its legislative authority, the rider had the
effect of excluding initiatives that would reduce marijuana penalties in the District of Columbia. See
id. at 82-85.
76. 450 F.3d 1082, 1085, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 2006). The plaintiffs also claimed that the
restrictions amounted to impermissible content discrimination or overbreadth under the First
Amendment, but the court rejected these contentions summarily because their success would require
that the restrictions affect protected speech or expression. Id. at 1103-05.
77. Wellwood, 172 F.3d at 1009.
78. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 85. This reasoning seems a bit distorted, since the
court was purportedly determining whether use of the initiative process itself is a First Amendment-
protected activity. See id. at 86 ("[A] ballot initiative could be used to increase marijuana penalties,
but opponents, including the MPP, may utilize all of their First Amendment-protected tools to resist
such efforts.").
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ability to appear on the ballot.7 9 The D.C. and Tenth Circuits denied that
Meyer and ACLF might bear on the constitutionality of subject matter re-
strictions, emphasizing that these cases addressed limitations on petition
circulators rather than prohibitions on initiatives on certain subjects. s The
Tenth Circuit stressed that subject matter restrictions affect the speech sur-
rounding the initiative process only incidentally.8 '
Second, circuit courts concluding that subject matter restrictions warrant
no First Amendment review framed the restrictions as structural features of
government, contrasting them with regulations on speech. This was particu-
larly central in Marijuana Policy Project, where the court explained that the
subject matter restriction simply required proponents to appeal to Congress
instead of using D.C.'s initiative process. 8' The Tenth Circuit also character-
ized Utah's supermajority requirement for wildlife management initiatives
as a structural provision, likening it to the supermajority requirements that
apply to certain legislation enacted by state legislatures."
Finally, the First, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits emphasized that subject mat-
ter restrictions affected the ability to legislate more than the ability to
advocate, distinguishing firmly between the results of expression and ex-
pression itself.n The D.C. and First Circuits argued that, although the First
Amendment protects legislative advocacy, it "confers no right to legislate on
a particular subject."85 The Tenth Circuit found that the passage of an initia-
tive lacks the expressive element that would be present in the type of
11 86
"expressive conduct" envisioned by the O'Brien jurisprudence. And even
the First Circuit focused on the fact that subject matter restrictions target an
effect independent of speech-the resulting legislation-in holding that bal-
lot initiatives are "expressive conduct" rather than "core political speech.""
It noted that initiatives involve both speech and nonspeech elements, and
that the exclusions targeted "the act of generating laws and constitutional
79. See Walker, 450 F.3d at 1099-1100; Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 86; Wellwood,
172 F.3d at 1009.
80. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1099-1100; Marijuana Policy Project, 304 E3d at 86.
81. Walker, 450 E3d at 1100. The Tenth Circuit had also made this argument in Skrzypczak
v. Kauger, where the plaintiff challenged the Oklahoma Supreme Court's determination that an
initiative on abortion could not be placed on the ballot because the proposal was unconstitutional. 92
F.3d 1050, 1051, 1053 (10th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff remained free to advocate against abortion and
had no First Amendment right to have any particular proposition on the ballot, the court said. Id. at
1053. (The opinion focused on standing but has generally been viewed as a decision on the merits.
Walker, 450 F.3d at 1094.)
82. 304 E3d at 85-86.
83. Walker, 450 E3d at 1100-01.
84. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1099; Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 E3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2005); Mari-
juana Policy Project, 304 E3d at 85.
85. Wirzburger, 412 E3d at 277; Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 85.
86. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1102.
87. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 275-76.
May 2009] 1317
Michigan Law Review
amendments," only incidentally restricting speech." The First Circuit did
recognize an expressive aspect to the initiative process, stating that it "pro-
vides a uniquely provocative and effective method of spurring public debate
on an issue of importance to the proponents of the proposed initiative."89
However, it also shared the concerns of the other three circuits and so ap-
plied only intermediate First Amendment review.
II. THE PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT SUPPORT THE
RECOGNITION OF BALLOT INITIATIVES AS PROTECTED SPEECH
This Part argues that analyzing the ballot initiative instrument as pure
speech, the approach that no circuit court has adopted, is consistent with the
principles that underlie the First Amendment. Section I.A establishes that
the First Amendment aim of protecting speech regarding political change
and facilitating self-governance makes it particularly appropriate to apply
the First Amendment to subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives.
Section II.B asserts that use of the ballot initiative is relevantly analogous to
face-to-face discussion in the "public sphere," the intended locus of First
Amendment protection. Section II.C contends that the unrestricted operation
of the ballot initiative process is the type of interchange envisioned by the
"marketplace of ideas" model that has permeated First Amendment doctrine
and scholarship. This Section advocates for an unregulated model of the
marketplace of ideas, and emphasizes that insulating ballot initiatives from
restrictions on their subject matter is consistent with that ideal.
A. Ballot Initiative Procedures Implicate Primary Objects
of First Amendment Protection
Ballot initiatives' aims of achieving political change and facilitating self-
government, combined with their expressive nature, 90 put them within the
sphere of activities the First Amendment was designed to protect. There is
some consensus that the amendment serves primarily to protect expression
promoting political change. The Supreme Court has emphasized this pur-
pose, stating, for example, in Roth v. United States that "[t]he protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."9' The ballot initiative instrument, which enables citizens to enact a
88. Id. at 277-79; see also id. at 277 ("While [the exclusions] eliminate a valuable avenue of
expression about those subjects, the speech restriction is no more than an unintended side-effect of
the exclusions.").
89. Id. at 276.
90. See infra Section II.C. 1-2.
91. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The main-
tenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportu-
nity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
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new statute or constitutional amendment independently of the legislature, is
obviously intended to bring about political change.
Ballot initiatives also directly further self-government, 9 which aligns
them especially closely with the purposes of the First Amendment. Scholars
and courts have frequently stated that a central goal of the Constitution's
protection of expression is the success of self-government. Free-speech
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn, for example, notes that the First Amendment
serves to ensure the free flow of information so that citizens can determine
the direction of government without interference. 9 The Supreme Court, too,
has embraced the capacity to self-govern as a First Amendment value, em-
phasizing, for instance, that speech about government is especially worthy
of protection because it goes beyond simple self-expression and is "the es-
sence of self-government."" Speech is plainly more than self-expression in
the context of ballot initiatives, where its immediate object is to accomplish
legal changes driven by citizens.9
B. Ballot Initiatives Are Analogous to Face-to-Face
Discussion in the "Public Sphere"
The political discussion privileged by the First Amendment typically in-
volves ad hoc conversations among private citizens "on the ground.' 96 These
informal exchanges in the "public sphere" are thought to foster "government
by discussion" or "deliberative democracy."97 The First Amendment is
system."). Scholars have echoed this view. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 9-28 (1960); Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982).
92. The mechanism ballot initiatives provide for citizens to propose legislative or constitu-
tional changes and potentially pass them into law make them a tool of self-governance. See Collins
& Oesterle, supra note 10, at 56.
93. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 91, at 75 ("The primary purpose of the First Amendment is...
that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.
That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may
be kept from them. Under the compact on which the Constitution rests, it is agreed that men shall
not be governed by others, that they shall govern themselves."). Some scholars also describe the
First Amendment as fostering "collective self-determination." See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Displac-
ing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2587,
2591 (2007).
94. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74-75 (1964)).
95. See supra text accompanying note 10. Ballot initiatives' self-governing aspect also mag-
nifies their communicative impact. As the First Circuit stated in Wirzburger, "[t]he communicative
power of an initiative stems precisely from the fact that it is not just speech; it is a process that can
lead to the creation of new laws or constitutional amendments." Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271,
277 (1st Cir. 2005).
96. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
97. William Marshall, Free Speech and the "Problem" of Democracy, 89 Nw. U. L. REv.
191, 194-95 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993)).
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intended, in part, to "protect from [government] regulation the communica-
tive processes of 'private' citizens deemed necessary for self-governance." g
Ballot initiatives, although they occur within--or at least are structured
by-an "official" government framework, rather than a grassroots setting,
and despite their departure from face-to-face discussion, should be protected
on the same level as informal political speech occurring in the "public
sphere." Ballot initiatives are a natural extension of this informal political
communication. Casual discussion of political views develops into ex-
changes about the content and form of an initiative, into the circulation of
petitions, into communication through media, and finally, into the presence
of an initiative on the ballot.99 It is incongruous for the government to stead-
fastly insulate the first phase of communication because it wants to promote
independent self-governance, but to foreclose political communication cate-
gorically by subject once it starts to actually bring about self-governance.
Citizens of the District of Columbia, for example, may speak, write, and
debate all they want about lowering drug penalties, protected by the First
Amendment, but may not propose this idea in the ballot initiative setting.
The First Amendment protects informal discussions among citizens in
order to prevent the government from suppressing ideas developed to pro-
mote political change-but the government does just that when it excludes
certain subjects from the ballot initiative process. The traditional conception
of political speech occurring among private individuals in informal settings
should not preclude the recognition of ballot initiatives as protected speech.
The rationales motivating the protection of face-to-face political communi-
cation in the public sphere also support the protection of ballot initiatives.
98. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Dis-
course, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1125 (1993). Conversely, when a speaker is no longer speaking
as a private citizen, but in a public government context (for example, as an elected official), she no
longer falls within the scope of First Amendment protection as it applies to foster self-govemance.
Id. at 1125-26. One might conclude that because ballot initiatives are not situated within this grass-
roots arena, they are not appropriately characterized as speech about which the First Amendment
should be especially concerned. Direct democracy is, in fact, increasingly moving away from its
traditional or ideal form of face-to-face conversation, as classic town meetings are supplanted by
ballot initiatives that take place among millions of dispersed citizens. See Frickey, supra note 21, at
432; see also MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 22; Anderson & Ciampa, supra
note 22, at 73. But the following discussion establishes that ballot initiatives warrant the same First
Amendment protection as informal political conversations.
99. See infra Section III.C.1 for a discussion of the presence of an initiative on the ballot as
public discussion.
100. Recognition of ballot initiatives as speech on the same level as informal political discus-
sions in the public sphere also reflects tangible changes in how U.S. society operates. Many sources
suggest that the occurrence of political speech in the traditionally imagined fora is dwindling. See,
e.g., Crocker, supra note 93, at 2589-90; Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Market: The Supreme Court and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. & PoL. 489,
547-48 (2001). Other venues are becoming more important, as face-to-face discussions are replaced
by communication over the internet and through the media. See Crocker, supra note 93, at 2589-90
("[T]he decline of the public sphere [has been] brought about by the increased organization of mod-
em life. Quite apart from rising concerns over security, modem life has diminished the role of
traditional places where the public might gather and mingle, such as town greens, parks, sidewalks,
and pedestrian streets. Justice Anthony Kennedy has noted this problem: 'Minds are not changed in
streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of
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C. The Ballot Initiative Device Creates a "Marketplace of Ideas "
The unrestricted use of ballot initiatives also mirrors the "marketplace of
ideas" model that permeates First Amendment doctrine and scholarship,
suggesting that subject matter restrictions invoke First Amendment con-
cerns.'0 ' A prominent view of the First Amendment has been that its
protection of speech serves to facilitate the unhindered exchange of ideas,
like goods in a marketplace.' As with the traditional economic free market,
the evaluation of arguments is thought to yield the best results when all po-
tential ideas are available for consideration and people are unrestricted in
•• 103
their evaluation of competing propositions. The uninhibited exchange of
ideas, in turn, furthers the First Amendment aim of fostering social and po-
litical change.T 4 Accordingly, political speech in particular has been
envisioned in terms of a "marketplace of ideas."'' Justice Holmes was the
first to articulate the concept, stating that the U.S. Constitution rests on the
theory that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market."' 6
ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media.' ") (quoting Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing)); Pinaire, supra, at 547-48. Ballot initiatives, too, are an alternative means for the citizenry to
exchange political ideas as in-person communication becomes less prevalent. The doctrine better
preserves First Amendment values when it is sensitive to societal shifts that alter how traditionally
protected activities are carried out.
101. Baker, supra note 65, at 968, 973.
102. Id.; Redish, supra note 91, at 593; see also, e.g:, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 41 t (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982); Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); N.Y
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
103. Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REv. 671, 726-27 (1983) ('The marketplace of ideas theory is based on the view that government
should not interfere with robust debate or the free flow of information because competition among
ideas advances knowledge and leads to better decisions. .... [lindividuals can only choose their ends
and values if they are exposed to the broadest possible set of information, knowledge, and ideas.").
104. Baker, supra note 65, at 971; see also supra Section Hl.A; infra Section m.C.2. Several
scholars have noted that citizens' meaningful participation in political decision making requires full
information. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 91, at 75; Emerson, supra note 65, at 423-24. Com-
plete access to ideas depends on government neutrality toward political speech and information. See
Baker, supra note 65, at 970.
105. Pinaire, supra note 100, at 493.
106. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Court has invoked this notion in
several cases since. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 53 ("The free exchange of ideas provides special
vitality to the process traditionally at the heart of American constitutional democracy-the political
campaign."); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 295 ("The Court has long viewed the First
Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas.");
N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 270 ("[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open...."); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence
... believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth ... and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones.").
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Ballot initiatives clearly exemplify the "marketplace of ideas" para-
digm-perhaps even better than individual political discussions among
citizens do. Initiatives certainly enhance the availability and awareness of
political ideas, having an "educative" effect.1 7 They also create a space for
competition that provides clear returns for the most-favored ideas. Not only
do citizens evaluate opposing propositions and choose the one they prefer,
arriving at the "truth" or best choice-but they consume them, in a manner
of speaking, by affirmatively putting them into effect. This creates an incen-
tive for proponents to advocate the most attractive ideas. It is hard to
imagine a scenario that more closely reflects the market framework.
Within the marketplace model, some might try to justify subject matter
restrictions on ballot initiatives as interventions designed to correct market
imperfections. Indeed, some scholars reject the ideal of a pure free market
for political speech and advocate instead for government regulation of such
speech to remedy perceived deficiencies in the market. The main reason
given for government intervention in the marketplace of political ideas is to
"equalize" opportunities for participation in the market---essentially, to level
the playing field.'09 This usually involves limiting speakers who are seen as
particularly loud or powerful and so threaten to drown out other voices. " °
The Court has adopted this approach occasionally, accepting limits on cer-
tain speakers when the limits served to enhance other speakers' ability to
participate meaningfully in political debate."' The Court is more likely to
tolerate such constraints when they merely limit the degree of speech, rather
than precluding the opportunity to speak altogether."
12
Supporters of the market-interference view find it more favorable to
First Amendment values than the unrestrained market is. Professors
107. Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1465.
108. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 93, at 2606-07 (framing the contrast as between autonomy
and the "public debate principle," which invites intervention to equalize the playing field in politi-
cal-speech contexts); Pinaire, supra note 100, at 490, 501 (contrasting a "liberty" conception of the
marketplace of ideas with "equality" and "civility" conceptions).
109. See Baker, supra note 65, at 981-85; Pinaire, supra note 100, at 519-20, 527.
110. See Pinaire, supra note 100, at 526-27. Cass Sunstein has been a strong proponent of this
view, advocating for government limits on dominant voices to promote the diversity of viewpoints
heard and to ensure that individuals' decision making is informed. Post, supra note 98, at 1124;
Marshall, supra note 97, at 195-96 (reviewing CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
111. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990) (upholding a
limitation on corporate contributions to state electoral candidates in order to mitigate the political
influence of corporations, who have a special state-conferred ability to amass large amounts of
money); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding a network television station's
obligation to provide a qualified electoral candidate "reasonable access" to air time and noting that
this promoted First Amendment values by enhancing candidates' ability to communicate their
ideas).
112. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (upholding a limitation
on campaign contributions where they did not preclude the opportunity for expression but only
limited the amount of a contribution, and emphasizing that regulation, by equalizing the amount of
money that supporters could contribute, enhanced the fairness of the process).
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Frederick Schauer and Richard H. Pildes endorse such a positivist approach
to the First Amendment:
[I]t is not self-evident that the values of democratic deliberation, collective
self-determination, guarding against the abuse of power, searching for
truth, and even self-expression are better served by treating government in-
tervention as the unqualified enemy than by allowing the state a limited
role in fostering the proliferation of voices in the public sphere or of in-
creasing the importance of message and effort by decreasing the
importance of wealth." 3
Others adhere to the original market approach, maintaining a laissez-
faire philosophy that rejects government regulation of speech even to further
alleged First Amendment ideals. This conception privileges the unhindered
flow of ideas, presuming that government inaction will allow the best results
to emerge. 4 It aims to maximize the number of speakers and amount of
overall speech, rather than keeping speakers in check to preserve a certain
balance, maintaining that this will create the most productive market."5 The
Court has echoed this idea in several political speech cases.'16
The unregulated marketplace is more consistent with First Amendment
principles than the regulated marketplace is. Regulations on the market of
political speech are problematic in two significant ways. First, regulations
seeking to make the political speech arena more fair or democratic necessar-
ily have a role in shaping the political agenda."17 Such regulations could
simply cater to the current government's preferences: "in the guise of cor-
recting private manipulation, the government may distort the debate in a
way that manipulatively serves its own purposes.""" Even when the govern-
ment has a more benign approach, its judgments about how to circumscribe
speech are inherently subjective: when the regulations are designed to pro-
mote diversity or equality, these values are chosen and defined by
politicians." 9 And even viewpoint-neutral regulations have a strong agenda-
setting effect. 2 ° As Justice Scalia noted, "[t]he premise of our Bill of Rights
... is that there are some things--even some seemingly desirable
113. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amend-
ment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1999). Schauer and Pildes suggest that rights are properly
viewed as tools to achieve societal goals such as the above-mentioned First Amendment interests,
rather than as mere defenses of the individual against the government. Id. at 1814-15.
114. Baker, supra note 65, at 964-65; Pinaire, supra note 100, at 502.
115. Pinaire, supra note 100, at 502-09.
116. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-423 (1988); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for
Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1976); see also Pinaire, supra note 100, at 503-09.
117. Marshall, supra note 97, at 205-06 (reviewing CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
118. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUm. L.
REV. 334, 364 (1991).
119. Post, supra note 98, at 1125-26; Marshall, supra note 97, at 205-06.
120. Marshall, supra note 97, at 206.
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things-that government cannot be trusted to do. The very first of these is
establishing the restrictions upon speech that will assure 'fair' political de-
bate." '
2
'
Second, government regulation of the market of political speech contra-
venes the aim of self-governance. It is fundamentally contradictory to
impose external restraints on political speech whose privileged status de-
rives from its importance to autonomous decision making. 22 Such
regulations create an "internal disequilibrium," as politicians seek to create a
balanced and egalitarian forum for speech and in so doing determine the
overall content of that speech.12  Adjusting the boundaries of self-
government to promote a particular set of values has the effect of "de-
cid[ing] in advance the very issue of collective identity that public discourse
is meant to be the means of resolving."' 24 Ultimately, government restric-
tions diminish the core role of the speakers in shaping the course of debate,
a process best left to market forces, and undermine true self-governance.
The truly free marketplace, then, is the conception against which subject
matter restrictions on ballot initiatives should be judged. Subject matter re-
strictions on ballot initiatives are inconsistent with the ideal of the/ 25
unregulated market. The government cannot, in keeping with the true
"marketplace of ideas" philosophy, pick and choose what sorts of ideas may
be exchanged through the ballot initiative process. Our constitutional protec-
tion of speech "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authorita-
tive selection."' 26 The First Amendment reflects the principle that a
democracy leaves it to the people to judge political arguments.'17 As the
Court put it in Brown v. Hartlage, "[t]he State's fear that voters might make
an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justifica-
tion for limiting speech."'28 Any danger that citizens will make decisions
121. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
122. Post, supra note 98, at 1128 ("Constitutional solicitude for public discourse ... presup-
poses that those participating in public discourse are free and autonomous. Public discourse could
not serve the project of self-determination if the opinions and attitudes of speakers were deemed to
be merely the effects of external causes."); Marshall, supra note 97, at 204-05.
123. Post, supra note 98, at 1133.
124. Id. at 1121.
125. Russell Patrick Plato, Note, Selective Entrenchment Against State Constitutional
Change: Subject Matter Restrictions and the Threat of Differential Amendability, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1470, 1498 (2007) ("Subject matter restrictions constitute 'political lockups' in the market for po-
litical control. The very essence of subject matter restrictions is their 'anti-competitive' nature: They
raise a barrier to those wishing to enter the constitutional sphere.") (advocating for an Equal Protec-
tion analysis in the judicial review of subject matter restrictions on state constitutional initiatives).
126. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v. Associ-
ated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
127. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 n.7 (1988); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60
(1982); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
128. Brown, 456 U.S. at 60.
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contrary to their own interests is one that was "contemplated by the Framers
of the First Amendment.
'1 29
Even if we were to accept the propriety of market regulations, subject
matter restrictions on ballot initiatives do not reflect even the least objec-
tionable rationales for such restrictions. The restrictions do not function to
curb one overpowering voice, or to enhance certain underrepresented voices;
rather, they eliminate voices from the process altogether. They are not mere
limits on degree, but qualitative restrictions that wholly exclude certain
ideas."3 Subject matter restrictions do nothing to improve the diversity or
fairness of political exchanges, but simply seek to predetermine the potential
results of those interactions.
Subject matter restrictions, in fact, violate a fundamental principle of the
First Amendment-that the government may not impose its own preferences
on citizens' political decision making. Subject matter restrictions suppress
opinions contrary to a transient legislative majority.13' The First Amendment,
however, prohibits the government from suppressing speech it disagrees
• 132
with. As the Framers emphasized, the United States' structure of govern-
ment locates sovereignty in the people, and correspondingly, "the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people. , 3  When citizens express their opinions through ballot ini-
tiatives, "the power of popular sovereignty flows directly into law without
the buffer of representation."'m It is especially problematic, then, for the
government to restrict speech based on its own preferences in the context of
ballot initiatives. 135
III. BALLOT INITIATIVES QUALIFY AS "CORE POLITICAL SPEECH"
UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The preceding Part established that the First Amendment should protect
ballot initiatives from government interference with their subject matter be-
cause of the close connections between initiatives and the values underlying
129. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792.
130. Even heightened majority requirements for initiatives on certain subjects tend to have the
effect of precluding initiatives on those subjects. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Section I.B.
132. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys."); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 587 (1974) (White, J., concurring); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972).
133. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (quoting 4 Annals of Congress 934
(1794) (statement of James Madison)).
134. M. Sean Radcliffe, Comment, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiative Petitions: An
Unreasonable Limitation on Political Speech, 30 TuLSA L.J. 425, 425 (1994).
135. It is perhaps in part because of subject matter restrictions' conflict with First Amendment
and other constitutional principles that their supporters have not sought to defend them as permissi-
ble limitations on speech, hut have stretched-hard-to position them outside of "speech"
altogether, so that they do not implicate the First Amendment at all.
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the First Amendment. This Part argues that ballot initiative procedures, in-
cluding the elements some courts have described as conduct, actually
constitute "core political speech" under First Amendment case law, such that
subject matter restrictions on initiatives trigger strict scrutiny-a level of
review that provides robust protection for initiative proponents' First
Amendment rights. Section III.A gives an overview of the Court's treatment
of restrictions on speech in the political and electoral contexts. This Section
lays out the two major categories the Court has developed to characterize
regulations that affect political and election-related speech: neutral rules
concerning mechanical aspects of the electoral process, and rules that di-
rectly affect "core political speech." Section III.B asserts that subject matter
restrictions on ballot initiatives do not regulate neutral mechanical aspects of
the political process, and that even if the restrictions were to be construed as
doing so, strict scrutiny review would be appropriate because the restrictions
impose a severe burden on expression. Section III.C argues that the ballot
initiative process-specifically, the actual presence of an initiative on the
ballot-is appropriately treated as "core political speech" under the relevant
doctrine, and, accordingly, that subject matter restrictions should be subject
to strict scrutiny review.
A. Two Standards for Analyzing Regulations that Affect
Political and Election-Related Speech
Supreme Court doctrine has distinguished between two broad species of
limitations on speech in the political and electoral contexts: procedural limi-
tations and direct restrictions. "36 The Court's characterization of a restriction
determines the level of review it will receive, and, correspondingly, the like-
lihood that the Court will uphold the restriction.
The first type of restriction is a regulation on neutral, mechanical aspects
of the electoral process--one that targets "procedural or administrative as-
pects of elections, 137 such as the timing of filing deadlines for presidential
candidates to get on the ballot,'38 voters' ability to submit write-in votes, 3 9
136. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1995); Michael Carlin,
Note, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.: Emblem of the Struggle Between
Citizens' First Amendment Rights and States' Regulatory Interests in Election Issues, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 477, 492-93 (2000). This distinction is independent of the distinction between "expressive
conduct" and ordinary speech (including "core political speech"), although both distinctions are
linked to a disparity in levels of review. The speech/expressive conduct dichotomy is centered on the
nature of the expression being affected by the regulation, while the distinction between neutral elec-
tion regulations and direct limitations on "core political speech" depends on the nature of the
regulation.
137. Carlin, supra note 136, at 493.
138. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (upholding challenge by voters and
presidential candidate to Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates).
139. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (challenge by voter to Hawaii's prohibition on
write-in voting).
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the permissibility of fusion (multiparty) candidates on the ballot,' 40 signature
thresholds for admission to the ballot,'1' or the amount of time that a candi-
date must be disaffiliated from her previous party before being listed as an
• 142
independent candidate. These regulations govern the logistics of the elec-
tion itself, as distinguished from expressive activity external to (usually
occurring prior to) the voting process.
In assessing the permissibility of these logistical restrictions under the
First Amendment, the Court considers the nature and magnitude of the bur-
den on expression and compares that burden to the state's interest in
enacting the regulation.'4 3 These restrictions receive substantial deference
from courts: election regulations that are "reasonable" and "nondiscrimina-
tory" can normally be justified by "important" regulatory interests of the
government. 14 In the rare instance where an election regulation imposes a
"severe" burden on First Amendment rights to expression (or the right to
vote), it is subject to strict scrutiny.145
The second type of regulation is a rule that directly affects "core politi-
cal speech," rather than targeting a mechanical feature of the electoral
process.'4  These restrictions constrain political expression by limiting its
quantity, controlling its content, or proscribing it altogether. Regulations
falling into this category include limits on campaign expenditures, 47 a ban
on certain corporations' financial contributions to influence particular ballot48 149
referenda, 4 a prohibition on anonymous political pamphlets, and restric-
tions on ballot initiative petition circulators.5 Rather than addressing the
mechanics of elections, this type of regulation directly governs individuals'
or organizations' ability to engage in political expression regarding
140. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (challenge by political
party desiring to nominate a candidate of another party to Minnesota's ban on multiparty candi-
dates).
141. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (remanding on the question of whether Califor-
nia's five-percent petition signature requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on independent
presidential candidates' ballot access).
142. Id. (challenge to California's one-year disaffiliation requirement as applied to former
Democratic party members who sought access to the general election ballot as independent candi-
dates).
143. 7immons, 520 U.S. at 358-59; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see
also Anderson, at 790-93.
144. immons, 520 U.S. at 358-59; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
145. immons, 520 U.S. at 359; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Whether a burden is severe usually
turns on whether it applies in a content-neutral manner. See infra notes 160-164 and accompanying
text.
146. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995).
147. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
148. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
149. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334.
150. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414 (1988).
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elections. These regulations garner strict scrutiny, surviving only when they
are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
51
B. Subject Matter Restrictions on Ballot Initiatives-Regulations of
Neutral Mechanical Aspects of the Electoral Process?
Subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives should not be categorized
as neutral regulations of elections. They are "ballot access restrictions" of
sorts, as are some of the rules the Court has found to be neutral election
regulations."' However, the subject matter of ballot initiatives is not a pro-
cedural feature of the electoral process. Rather, subject matter restrictions
circumscribe, based on substance, the pool of initiatives permitted to use the
electoral process. Nor is it plausible to describe subject matter restrictions as
"neutral," particularly in the context of a First Amendment inquiry.'53 They
are not generally applicable, but single out certain initiatives for prohibition
based on the content of the idea proposed.
154
However, even if subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives could be
considered a neutral regulation of election mechanics, they should nonethe-
less be subject to strict scrutiny.55 Subject matter restrictions on ballot
initiatives do not reflect the rationales that support upholding many "reason-
able, nondiscriminatory" regulations of the electoral process. The low level
of scrutiny often applied to this type of regulation is driven by the Court's
recognition of the need for some rules to ensure the integrity, effectiveness,
and order of elections.5 6 The Court has upheld regulations aimed at avoiding
voter confusion and deception, preventing election machinery from becom-
ing clogged, and ensuring that the winner is indeed the majority's choice
and has sufficient support to be effective in office."' Regulations in this
category serve to protect the electoral process."' Subject matter restrictions
151. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; see ACLF, 525 U.S. 182; Meyer, 486 U.S. 414; Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765; Valeo, 424 U.S. 1.
152. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (prohibition on fusion
(multiparty) candidates on the ballot); Burdick v. Takusi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (prohibition on write-
in votes); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (filing deadline for candidates to get on the
ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (party disaffiliation and signature requirements).
153. The First Amendment privileges content neutrality, usually prohibiting discrimination
based on subject matter or viewpoint. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94, 96
(1972).
154. See infra Section I.C.3.
155. Sometimes even a neutral regulation of the electoral process will be found to impose a
severe burden, and so will garner strict scrutiny. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
156. 7immons, 520 U.S. at 358 (1997); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (1992); Storer, 415 U.S. at
730 (1974).
157. See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 732, 735, 736.
158. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).
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on ballot initiatives are aimed not at the electoral process, but at the electoral
results.19
Further, subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives are content dis-
criminatory. Courts have found even relatively mechanical election
regulations to impose a "severe" burden, and so to be subject to strict scru-
tiny, when the logistical regulations discriminate based on content or
speaker. 6 In Burson v. Freeman, for example, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to a regulation prohibiting campaign-related speech near polling places
on Election Day because the law defined the proscribed speech with refer-
ence to its subject matter. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to an early filing deadline for independent presidential candi-
dates to get on the ballot, noting that a regulation imposes a particularly
acute burden when it limits political participation by a particular group
united by viewpoint or associational preference. The Court characterized
this type of discrimination as restricting the "availability of political oppor-
tunity" in an "unfair" way.16 In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
however, the burden posed by another procedural regulation, a prohibition
on fusion candidates, was not "severe" because the regulation did not ex-
clude any particular group from participation in the political process.64
Subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives certainly discriminate based
on content and preclude certain groups from participating in the political
process, and so impose a "severe" burden on expression.
Ultimately, subject matter restrictions operate differently from most neu-
tral regulations of election mechanics. The latter can be justified, according
to the Court, because they 1) are "generally applicable and evenhanded,"
2) are designed to prevent distortions in the electoral process, 3) serve
159. See supra Section I.B. Even subject matter restrictions motivated by relatively neutral
concerns necessarily regulate the results of elections, rather than features of how the process oper-
ates.
160. See 7immons, 520 U.S. at 361;'Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992) (up-
holding the regulation in spite of the exacting level of review); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792-93.
161. Burson, 504 U.S. at 197-98. The Burson Court emphasized that the First Amendment
endangers a regulation prohibiting certain subjects of expression even when it is viewpoint neutral.
Id. at 197.
162. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792-93.
163. Id. (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)). The content discrimination was
compounded by the Court's observation that a candidate serves as a "rallying point for like-minded
citizens" to express their views on issues. Id. at 787-88.
164. immons, 520 U.S. at 361; see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
960 (4th Cir 1992).
165. See supra Section I.B; infra Section IL.C.3. The 71mmons Court did deny any right to
use the ballot to send a "particularized message," 520 U.S. at 363, seemingly undermining the rec-
ognition of a "severe" burden on the First Amendment right to bring ballot initiatives unhindered by
subject matter restrictions. However, the Court went on to emphasize that under the fusion-candidate
prohibition, the party could still use its participation in the election to communicate ideas to voters
and its preferred candidate would still appear on the ballot (albeit as another party's candidate),
id.,-benefits that would elude a group seeking to propose an initiative on a particular prohibited
subject.
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legitimate government objectives unrelated to First Amendment values,'6
and 4) do not discriminate against a particular group. 67 Subject matter re-
strictions on ballot initiatives, which suppress initiatives on certain topics
and prevent particular results, possess none of these saving characteristics.
C. The Ballot Initiative Qualifies as "Core Political Speech"
An initiative on the ballot for a vote, even considered independently
from surrounding communication such as that involved in petitioning, em-
bodies the characteristics that courts have found define "core political
speech." Some of the courts in the circuit split did consider whether subject
matter restrictions on ballot initiatives affected "core political speech"; how-
ever, they only contemplated the preliminary petitioning and advocacy
efforts as such (and tended to find that those were not formally affected by
the restrictions), not the presence of the initiative on the ballot itself. '68 This
Section argues that ballot initiatives constitute "core political speech," and
so should be subject to strict scrutiny, for several reasons: 1) they are a form
of public discussion, 169 2) they involve communication about government
affairs and directly facilitate self-government,' and 3) the regulations in
question limit expression based on its content."' It will then refute argu-
ments that the ballot initiative process does not fall into the doctrinal
category of "core political speech."
1. Public Discussion
An activity qualifies as "core political speech" if it constitutes publicr • 172
discussion about political affairs. Nearly all of the courts involved in the
circuit split considered whether ballot initiatives (in the sense of the actual
presence of an initiative on the ballot for a vote) genuinely constitute
"speech," or whether they are exclusively a form of conduct-the act of
166. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9.
167. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974) (involving potential discrimination against
independent candidates).
168. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1099-1101 (10th Cir. 2006);
Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2005); Marijuana Policy Project v. United States,
304 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wellwood v. Johnson ex rel. Bryant, 172 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.
1999); Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1996).
169. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49, 52
(1976); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
170. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-
22; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14.
17 1. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85.
172. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22; Valeo, 424 U.S. at 49, 52; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375
(Brandeis, J., concurring). It is more difficult to establish that ballot initiatives comprise "public
discussion" than that they involve communication about government affairs or that subject matter
restrictions on them discriminate based on content.
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making law. All but the First Circuit found that they were exclusively con-
duct. "
The First Circuit found that ballot initiatives involve some expression,
but are primarily a form of conduct-and concluded that they should ac-
cordingly be evaluated as "expressive conduct" rather than "core political
speech."'14 The ballot initiative mechanism does clearly combine lawmak-
ing, a form of conduct, with fundamental political expression. The problem
is that these elements are too intertwined to legitimately be conceived of as
separable.' The lawmaking or "conduct" element is not a neutral action
unrelated to the speech,76 but also has a close relationship to First Amend-
ment concerns.' The conduct element is a central feature of the expressive
nature of an initiative on the ballot,' and the First Amendment's protection
of speech is motivated by speech's political effects.7 9 In the context of ballot
initiatives, at least, the potential for expression to translate into lawmaking,
admittedly a form of "conduct," does not justify imposing a lower standard
of First Amendment review-in fact, it makes imposing a higher standard
even more crucial. For the government to prohibit communication that can
result in laws because it can result in laws contravenes a central purpose of
the First Amendment's protection of speech. In addition, the "expressive
conduct" category and the corresponding intermediate scrutiny standard
have been plagued by various theoretical and practical problems." Actual
speech, then, is a more appropriate characterization of ballot initiatives.
173. See supra Section I.C.
174. One commentator also takes this approach, arguing for the recognition of ballot initia-
tives as "expressive conduct" because of their combination of conduct (lawmaking) and expressive
elements. John Gildersleeve's argument that ballot initiatives have an expressive nature focuses on
their agenda-setting effect. Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1463-69. He goes on to propose that the
insulation of complex issues and of state constitutional rights be considered "important" state inter-
ests under the intermediate scrutiny standard. Id. at 1476-80.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 193-195 (explaining the expression inherent in initia-
tive proponents' offer of a proposal to the voters for their response).
176. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (finding that burning a draft card
was "expressive conduct" because it involved an "independent noncommunicative impact" in addi-
tion to the symbolic expression of a message).
177. See supra Section H.A.
178. An initiative proponent "depends on the prospect of legislative effect to imbue her initia-
tive with the gravity necessary to influence the agenda." Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1470.
179. Although he argues for an "expressive conduct" analysis, Gildersleeve acknowledges
that the lawmaking function of ballot initiatives, although "conceptually dominant:' is frequently
"subordinate" to their expressive nature. Id. at 1469.
180. See Baker, supra note 65, at 1010 (arguing that the distinction between speech and con-
duct is problematic, since, for one thing, conduct can be just as expressive as speech); Emerson,
supra note 65, at 422-32 (noting that all of the proffered schemes for deciding what type of conduct
the First Amendment should protect are "exceedingly vague" and problematic). It would also be
plausible, for example, to characterize the circulation of initiative petitions as "expressive conduct,"
since it involves both the communication of a message and the act of gathering signatures. See Mari-
juana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 191 R Supp. 2d 196, 210 (D.D.C. 2002). In
addition, the intermediate scrutiny test is manipulable. The government interest can be conceived of
at different levels of abstraction, even throughout the process of applying the O'Brien test, making it
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Ballot initiatives clearly involve speech in the most literal sense, since
their execution relies on actual words on the ballot. In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, it was relevant to the Court's description of the
regulated activity as "core political speech" that the regulation governed
what information could be written in political pamphlets."' Subject matter
restrictions on ballot initiatives also affect written words that would
communicate ideas. However, this is true of ballot-access restrictions in
general, and typically has not prompted courts to consider them automatic
restrictions on "core political speech.' 82 Rather than relying on the mere
fact that ballot initiatives operate via actual written words, this Note focuses
on their significance as speech on a more abstract (and, in light of the
purposes of the First Amendment and "core political speech" doctrine, more
relevant) level, including the behest to voters to consider the issue and
respond with their vote, and the ability for the initiative to take effect as a
law.
The nature of the communication that ballot initiatives trigger between
proponents and voters supports initiatives' status as "core political speech."
A ballot initiative involves discussion of a particular political issue through-
out the process. 13 This includes the identification of an area of common
concern, agreement on a desired legislative change, the circulation of peti-
tions, and discussion in the media.84 Most significantly here, if the initiative
makes it on to the ballot, its proponents then communicate their desire for
political change to the voters en masse, inviting them to respond with their
own views by voting yes or no. Technically, all of these steps except the last
one could occur, relatively unhindered, even with a subject matter exclusion
•185
in effect. However, subject matter exclusions completely preclude the pos-
sibility of expressing particular proposed legislative changes to the voters
through the ballot. Not only is this the sole practical way of reaching a
broad swath of citizens and having them weigh in on an issue, but it consti-
tutes an important form of "public discussion" as established below.
possible for courts to essentially apply rational basis review instead of intermediate scrutiny. Plato,
supra note 125, at 1480; see also Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1460.
181. 514 U.S. 334, 345-47 (1995).
182. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 369-70 (1997)
(prohibition on fusion candidacies); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 441-42 (1992) (prohibi-
tion on write-in votes).
183. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 10, at 56-57.
184. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-16, Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 1996 U.S. Briefs 953
(No. 96-953); MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 130-34, 138; Conlin, supra note
11, at 1101. Even when they are ultimately unsuccessful, ballot initiatives garner a lot of media
attention. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 10, at 28; Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at
1465. In Meyer, the Court found it significant that the restriction on paid petition circulators limited
the "ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion" by making it less likely that the
initiative would make it to the ballot. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988).
185. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1100, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006);
Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wellwood v. Johnson ex
reL Bryant, 172 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).
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The two Supreme Court cases addressing restrictions on the expression
accompanying the initiative process support the characterization of an initia-
tive's presence on the ballot as "public discussion." In Meyer v. Grant, the
Court struck down a prohibition on paying initiative petition circulators,
8 6
and in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, it invalidated
requirements that circulators be registered to vote and wear identification
badges, and that their names, addresses, and compensation be reported.87 An
initiative's actual entry onto the ballot embodies the same features that led
the Meyer and ACLF Courts to label the attendant petitioning processes
"core political speech" and apply strict scrutiny to regulations on petition
circulation. 11 It emphasized in both cases that the petition efforts-
presumably involving initiative proponents speaking with individual citizens
and attempting to procure their support for the initiative-involved "interac-
tive communication concerning political change."'' 9 The presence of an
initiative on the ballot also constitutes "communication," involves "political
change," and is "interactive."'90
Ballot initiatives are a channel of communication. The words on the bal-
lot transmit a message from the proponents to the voters about the
proponents' views, their desire for certain legislation, and some information
about the proposed change. 9' The message also reaches people who hear
(from the media or by word of mouth) that the initiative reached the ballot,
whether or not they turn out to vote. The message transmitted by an initia-
tive on the ballot can have a strong impact on public discourse, "inserting
186. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414.
187. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
188. Many would argue, and some of the courts in the circuit split have concluded, that cases
like Meyer and ACLF were limited to the communications that accompany a ballot initiative effort
and do not support the recognition of the ability to get an initiative on the ballot, itself, as "core
political speech." Walker, 450 F.3d at 1085, 1086, 1100; Marijuana Policy Project, 304 E3d at 86;
Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1498 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1996). This Note does not claim that all
aspects of ballot initiatives are automatically "core political speech" simply because the Court rec-
ognized ballot initiative petition circulation as such. It argues, rather, that the Court's analysis in
Meyer and ACLF supports the independent conclusion that the legal ability to put an initiative on the
ballot for a vote constitutes "core political speech" because it creates public discussion, involves
government affairs, and is regulated based on content. It seems likely that subject matter restrictions
on ballot initiatives also dampen the speech surrounding the process and leading up to the initiative.
However, this alone is unlikely to support a First Amendment claim, since it does not create the type
of "chilling" effect that can sometimes sustain a finding of unconstitutional overbreadth. See Repub-
lican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 960 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Election practices that do not
threaten to penalize protected speech, but that may have some effect on the decision whether to seek
candidacy or engage in debate, are not overly broad."); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 6-7, Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Herbert, 2006 U.S. Briefs 89717 (No. 06-534).
This Note focuses on the restrictions' effect on initiatives themselves.
189. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 186; Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
190. An initiative on the ballot clearly focuses on political change. See infra Section III.C.2.
The following text will establish that it is communicative and interactive.
191. John Gildersleeve notes that the lawmaking function of ballot initiatives, although "con-
ceptually dominant," is frequently "subordinate" to their expressive role. Gildersleeve, supra note
39, at 1469. Another commentator has suggested that the initiative process may in fact be the most
effective way of communicating political ideas. Radcliffe, supra note 134, at 436-37.
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and elevating issues in the arena of political discussion," and can even shape
political agendas on the state and national level.' This effect can play out in
full force only once the initiative reaches the ballot. As one commentator
stated, "the intrinsic benefit of political debate, especially in the context of
direct democracy, occurs in the free exchange of ideas as a proposal is pro-
pounded, attacked, defended, and voted upon."
93
Ballot initiatives also embody the "interactive" element of the Meyer
analysis. On a structural level, the initiative, once on the ballot .for a vote,
involves reciprocal communication. The proponents offer a proposal to the
voters, asking their approval; the voters then respond, expressing their opin-
ion back to the proponents and to the rest of society. Merriam-Webster
defines "interactive" as "1: mutually or reciprocally active; 2: involving the
actions or input of a user .... ' The communication involved in ballot ini-
tiatives closely matches these definitions. Some might maintain that the
"interactive" element from Meyer requires one-on-one, face-to-face discus-
sions, which the operation of ballot initiatives on Election Day, admittedly,
lacks.'95 The Meyer Court found it relevant that petitioning involved "ex-
pression of a desire for political change" and a "discussion of the merits of
the proposed change."' 9 An initiative's presence on the ballot clearly in-
volves the first but probably lacks the second, at least in the sense of a
personal interaction. But face-to-face communication about the merits of a
proposed change is not a necessary element. Activities deemed "core politi-
cal speech" in other cases, particularly campaign spending, did not require
literal personal discussion of the issues' merits to constitute "core political
speech."' 97
192. Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1467; see also id. at 1465 ("The contemporary ballot has
... power to elevate and lend credibility to a political stance, regardless of whether voters convert
that stance into law.").
193. Radcliffe, supra note 134, at 437 (emphasis added).
194. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009). The Meyer Court did not consider the dictionary definition of the word, but the
Court has often referred to dictionaries in other cases. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 128 (1998); Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61
(1993); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 n.] 1 (1944).
195. See Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1468 ("[Slubject matter restrictions clearly do not
restrict one-on-one communications between an initiative proponent and the public.").
196. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,421 (1988).
197. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). Another concern is that "public discussion" may not encompass such focused advocacy. But
in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court noted that a regulation limiting expenditures in political campaigns
burdened core First Amendment expression irrespective of the fact that the spending aimed to vigor-
ously promote a particular candidate, rather than facilitate abstract discussion. 424 U.S. at 47-48
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). That ballot initiatives channel ex-
pression toward one tangible goal does not remove them from the realm of communication about
govemment affairs that deserves First Amendment protection.
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2. Discussion of Government Affairs
The presence of an initiative on the ballot is archetypal of a basic defin-
ing feature of "core political speech"-a focus on political matters. The
First Amendment itself functions in large part to protect political discussion,
which operates as a check on government through its contribution to politi-
cal change.' The Court has consistently echoed this purpose in its "core
political speech" cases.' 9 Finding that a regulation limiting political cam-
paign expenditures impermissibly restricted political speech in Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court stressed the importance of the unlimited exchange of ideas
in promoting political and social change.2°° In First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, striking down a regulation that barred certain corporate contribu-
tions to influence the outcome of particular ballot referenda as an
unconstitutional restriction on political speech, the Court emphasized that
the activity involved the discussion of government affairs-an area in which
First Amendment protection is crucial.' In Meyer v. Grant, the circulation
of petitions for a ballot initiative was protected "core political speech" in
part because it concerned political change around an issue of public concern
(the deregulation of the trucking industry)."0 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, the distribution of leaflets advocating a political viewpoint was
deemed "the essence of First Amendment expression" and upheld as "core
political speech. ' 3
Submitting a ballot initiative for a vote is straightforwardly political in
its substance, its goals, and the method through which it operates. The sub-
ject of a ballot initiative-proposed legislation-is innately political.
Initiatives are brought in order to influence the government; in fact, one goal
is often to criticize the legislature's handling of an issue.'O Protection of
ballot initiatives as "core political speech," then, is consistent with the First
Amendment's role as a check on representative government.2 5 Typically,
this influence would occur ad hoc, through informal discussion among citi-
zens that might eventually translate to pressures on their electedS 206
representatives. Ballot initiatives, though, create a direct bridge between
this type of public discussion and legislative change, allowing the citizenry
to accomplish change on its own. It is perhaps even more important that this
198. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also supra Section H.A.
199. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77; Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14; see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); supra Section I.A.
200. 424 U.S. at 14.
201. 435 U.S. at 776-77.
202. 486 U.S. at 421-22.
203. 514 U.S. at 347.
204. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 10, at 57; DuVivier, supra note 31, at 1193; William
Lawton Teague, Jr., Comment, Pre-Election Constitutional Review of Initiative Petitions: A Pox on
Vox Populi?, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 201,218 (1992).
205. Redish, supra note 91, at 592.
206. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 91, at 9-28.
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distilled, structured form of public discussion, which takes place through the
development, submission, and placement on the ballot of a proposal for leg-
islative change, be free from government interference with its content.
3. Regulation Based on Content
Subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives are especially burden-
some to "core political speech" because they regulate communication about
government affairs with regard to its content, restricting potential initiatives'
access to the ballot based on the message they convey.20 Because subject
matter restrictions preclude challenges to the status quo on certain subjects,
they may also be viewpoint discriminatory.208 (Some, such as D.C.'s prohibi-
tion on initiatives that would reduce, but not those that would increase,
penalties for drug use, certainly are.209) The First Amendment does not gen-
erally tolerate regulations that distinguish based on content,20 and courts
have been particularly apt to find "core political speech" curtailed when
regulations operate with reference to the specific ideas expressed. In
Bellotti, for example, the expression fell within the scope of First
Amendment protection in part because the restriction at issue singled out
communication surrounding ballot questions on particular subjects.2 '
In circuit cases that upheld generally applicable regulations on initiative
petition signature requirements and on the format of ballot initiatives with-
out considering initiatives "core political speech," the courts emphasized
that the regulations were content neutral-one even explicitly noting that
rules that did distinguish based on content would be subject to strict scru-
tiny.
21 2
207. Arguing that ballot initiatives amount to "core political speech" because a certain type of
restriction on them happens to discriminate based on content might seem to put the cart before the
horse. However, the effect of restrictions is an important motivating factor in First Amendment
doctrine, and several cases also consider the nature of the restrictions in their characterization of the
activity as speech. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978).
208. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 770 (2d Cir. 1999), aff'd, 531 U.S.
533 (2001). J. Michael Connolly proposes looking to intent to determine whether subject matter
restrictions on ballot initiatives are viewpoint discriminatory or merely content discriminatory. See
supra note 53. For reasons mentioned above, this approach is problematic. See id.
209. See Marijuana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 191 F. Supp. 2d 196, 213
(D.D.C. 2002).
210. The Court stated in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
211. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96). In McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Commission, where the problematic distinction was between election-related speech and non-
election-related speech, content discrimination also played a role in implicating the First Amend-
ment. 514 U.S. at 345-46 (regulation treating communication differently based on whether it
included the name and address of the speaker and whether it sought to influence voters in an elec-
tion).
212. Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1997) (considering signature re-
quirements equal to ten percent of registered voters on submission date); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89
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4. Counterarguments
There are several potential objections to categorizing ballot initiative
mechanisms as "core political speech": that the presence of an initiative on
the ballot is fundamentally about the action of lawmaking and so does not
embody any expressive element; that any expression that would occur
through an initiative on the ballot can still occur in another forum if the ini-
tiative is excluded from the ballot; and that because states have the authority
to retract the entire initiative process, they may also constitutionally remove
any subject from initiative lawmaking. All of these arguments are flawed.
Some have argued that subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives are
designed to prevent the result of speech-lawmaking-rather than speech
itself,213 and so are not truly restrictions on speech. But fear of communica-
tion's potential results does not remove it from the realm of expression
protected by the First Amendment. As long as speech is not coercive, the
government may not restrict it simply because it is effective.214 Ballot initia-
tives are unique in the extent to which they channel expression into concrete
results (whether an initiative passes or fails),'" but the fact that the expres-
sion has an established means through which it may influence the law is not
a defensible reason to limit it. In fact, much of the value we attribute to
216speech derives from its potential to convince. As the Court stated in
Bellotti, "the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a rea-
son to suppress it.''217 It is especially objectionable for the government to
restrict speech because of an undesired predicted effect on voters,218 as it
does when it restricts the subject matter of ballot initiatives.
Another argument opposing the recognition of subject matter restrictions
as limitations on "core political speech" is that a subject matter exclusion
F.3d 1491, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1996) (single-subject, accurate title, and explanatory-statement require-
ments); see also Protect Marriage Ill. v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a
generally applicable regulation on advisory ballot questions in part because it was content neutral);
Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1993) (requirement
that petition signatures be found valid in order to be counted). But see Buckley v. Am. Constitutional
Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (maintaining that a generally applicable restriction on the circula-
tion of ballot initiative petitions affected "core political speech" and so triggered strict scrutiny);
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (same). The distinction between content-discriminatory and
content-neutral restrictions is similar to that between substantive and procedural or structural subject
matter restrictions discussed in Section I.B, supra.
213. See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2005) ("While [the restrictions]
eliminate a valuable avenue of expression about those subjects, the speech restriction is no more
than an unintended side-effect of the exclusions."); see also supra Section I.C.
214. Strauss, supra note 118, at 334-35.
215. Robyn R. Polashuk, Comment, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fair-
ness Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391, 402 (1993) ("Unlike the typical
public controversy in which informed debate may not have any concrete consequence, ballot meas-
ures create laws and amend constitutions.").
216. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
305-06 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1976); see also Strauss, supra note 118, at
337.
217. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
218. Strauss, supra note 118, at 338.
1337May 20091
Michigan Law Review
does not wholly preclude expression on a given subject-it merely prohibits
it in a certain context. 19 Would-be initiative proponents, the argument goes,
remain free to speak, petition (unofficially), advocate, and even lobby their
legislators about the issue-they just cannot submit a ballot initiative.20 But
this does not negate the ballot initiative's status as "core political speech."
The Court has struck down many restrictions on "core political speech"
despite the fact that speech on the same issue could be pursued through
other channels. 22' Neither the campaign expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo nor
the ballot initiative petitions in ACLF, for example, were the only means of
getting a specific idea across. Significantly, the Meyer Court stated "[t]hat
appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate their ideas does
not take their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First
Amendment protection. 22 ' The setting in which speech occurs can be as
important as the content. 22 The Meyer Court did not see an acceptable
alternative in forcing the petitioners to communicate their message through
another channel, noting that the regulations "restrict[ed] access to the most
effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political
,9224discourse. The unique opportunity that ballot initiatives themselves
provide to raise an issue to the level of statewide recognition, solicit a
response from voters, and potentially put an idea into effect as law makes
their context especially significant under the First Amendment.25 Given the
"dramatic power of an initiative that attains ballot status to shape the agenda
of state and even national politics,"'226 initiatives provide a unique
communicative opportunity even when they do not succeed.
Finally, those who believe subject matter restrictions are unreviewable
under the First Amendment argue that states' power to ban or revoke the
ballot initiative process altogether also allows them to ban subsets of poten-
219. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 .3d 1082, 1085, 1086, 1100 (10th Cir.
2006); Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 E3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Skrzypczak v.
Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1996).
220. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1085, 1086, 1100; Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 85;
Skrzypczak, 92 F.3d at 1053.
221. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765; Valeo, 424 U.S. 1.
222. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,424 (1988).
223. Crocker, supra note 93, at 2588.
224. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424; see also Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 812 (1984) ("While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every
conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, a restriction on expressive
activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.") (citation omit-
ted); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 276 (1st Cir. 2005) ("A state initiative process provides a
uniquely provocative and effective method of spurring public debate on an issue of importance to
the proponents of the proposed initiative.").
225. See Gildersleeve, supra note 39, at 1468 ("[A] ban does prevent [an] advocate from
shaping the state political agenda in the manner and to the extent uniquely possible by qualifying for
the ballot.").
226. Id. at 1464.
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tial initiatives. 27 The Court rejected this argument in Meyer v. Grant, how-
ever, stating that once the state creates the opportunity for citizens to enact
ballot initiatives, it must maintain it in a manner that complies with the Con-
228
stitution. Procedural restrictions on initiatives may not always pose a
constitutional threat, particularly when they are generally applicable. How-
ever, regulations that distinguish among initiatives with regard to their
221
subject matter necessarily implicate the First Amendment. Considering a
procedural restriction on the certification of advisory ballot questions
(which are largely analogous to ballot initiatives) in Protect Marriage
Illinois v. Orr, the Seventh Circuit found that because the Constitution pro-
vides no right to the advisory ballot question process in general, the state is
free to impose procedural rules such as those designed to prevent ballot clut-
ter.230 However, the court emphasized that its holding would not permit
231
regulations that discriminated against specific advocates or viewpoints.
Initiative proponents do not have a First Amendment right to bring ballot
initiatives in general, but they do have a First Amendment right not to be
denied use of the process based on the subject matter of the initiative.
CONCLUSION
Ballot initiatives should qualify as protected speech, such that state re-
strictions on their content should trigger strict scrutiny review under the
First Amendment. The ballot initiative mechanism is appropriately protected
by the First Amendment because of initiatives' deeply political nature, their
parallels with public discussion among citizens in the public sphere, their
centrality to the self-governing activities the First Amendment seeks to pro-
tect, and their structural similarity to the "marketplace of ideas." Ballot
initiatives' interactive, communicative nature and focus on political ideas
also put them firmly within the doctrinal category of "core political speech."
Subject matter restrictions on initiatives directly constrain "core political
speech" based on content and so should be subject to strict scrutiny,
227. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1099-1100 (10th Cir. 2006);
Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 E3d 82, 85-86 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Skrzypczak v.
Kauger, 92 E3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1996).
228. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424-25. The Court distinguished Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), which did hold that the state's power to wholly
ban an activity---casino gambling-gave it the power to ban advertisements of the activity. Meyer,
486 U.S. at 424-25. It emphasized that Posadas concerned only tangentially protected commercial
speech, while Meyer involved "core political speech." Id. States may not grant citizens a venue for
political expression, at least, and then restrict the use of it based on content. See also Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547-48 (2001); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981);
Wyman v. Sec'y of State, 625 A.2d 307, 311 (Me. 1993).
229. See supra Section M.C.3; see also Protect Marriage 11. v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604 (7th Cir.
2006).
230. Protect Marriage Ill., 463 F.3d 604.
231. Id. at 606 ("If a state can thus ban advisory questions from the ballot altogether, it can
impose requirements designed to avoid ballot clutter, provided the requirements are not jiggered in a
way that discriminates against particular advocates or viewpoints.").
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surviving only when a court finds they achieve a compelling government
interest and burden constitutional rights no more than necessary to fulfill
that interest.
